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         he sub-title of Stephen Prickett’s latest book could be “How 
to Drive a Postmodernist Crazy.” Prickett’s output (thirteen books and over 
seventy articles) has ranged from the poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth 
to Victorian fantasy, to the relation between romanticism and religion and 
biblical hermeneutics. In this book he turns his attention to post-modernist 
theorists in both science and literature. He includes ideas developed more 
thoroughly in his previous books and combines them with a new approach. 
This time he provides an overview of how the majority of modern scientific 
and literary theorists have ended up where they are today (and why they 
are wrong). He calls them fundamentalists, of all things! He could hardly 
have chosen a more ironically insulting word for people who like to think of 
themselves as eminently liberal and progressive.
 His thesis is that as confidence in absolute truth diminished over the 
past three centuries, scientists borrowed from the epistemological toolbox 
of literary theorists who claim not to be describing a fixed truth but more 
modestly to be just “telling a story.” The writers he critiques (Jean-François 
Lyotard, Stephen Hawking, Stephen Jay Gould, Nicholas Lash, Edward Said, 
Richard Rorty, Michael Foucalt, and similar theorists of the past thirty-five 
years) are guilty of being fundamentalists. (He defines a fundamentalist as 
someone who believes in an all embracing system of explanation.) To say, 
as the post-modernist does, that there can be no dogma, is itself a dogmatic 
statement. Using a self-refuting definition of the term “ironic” to describe 
language and knowledge, they reject any objective reference point and 
embrace a “Cretan paradox—exemplified in the Greek story of the Cretan 
who says ‘all Cretans are liars.’ If the Cretan is telling the truth, then he 
himself must be lying” (23). For Prickett, the term “ironic” should be defined 
in a Socratic and Kierkegaardian way, as having “a hidden meaning, or an 
awareness of a hidden meaning.” Instead, these writers view irony as proof 
that there is no meaning. What these writers describe as “narrative” actually 
T
serves a similar purpose to “myth,” which is to make sense of contradictory 
and partial knowledge.
 Prickett, like George MacDonald, derives much of his philosophy 
from the German Romantics and the early nineteenth century English 
thinkers who followed them, such as S. T. Coleridge, Julius Hare and F. D. 
Maurice. It is convenient to trace the development of Romanticism from 
Kant. Kant attempted to solve the problems of empiricism and scepticism 
left by Locke and Hume. If we view the history of philosophy as variations 
of the relation between objective and subjective knowledge, Kant sought to 
locate the authority for knowledge in [end of page 90] the subjective. 
He wanted to protect religious truth from both Rationalism (which denied the 
miraculous) and Empiricism (which similarly denied what cannot be sensed). 
So he emphasised the importance of the subjective experience, or what he 
called “the Transcendental I.” Of course, this is a simplification, but it serves 
to give a brief outline of the epistemology Kant and later philosophies such as 
Romanticism and Transcendentalism were seeking to improve upon.
 Kant was continuing an Augustinian and Platonic tradition which 
emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as people began to 
look towards a personal “inner light” for their understanding and source of 
values. Kant sought to bridge his first and second critiques on Reason and 
Understanding with his Critique of Judgement (1790). Just as literature and 
science continued to internalise personal identity and externalise nature, 
Kant’s philosophy came to prioritise the reflective “judgement” of aesthetic 
qualities such as the sublime and the beautiful as perceived through nature 
and art. Later Romantics, Following Schiller’s The Aesthetic Education of 
Man (1795), gave the arts the primary role in constructing our understanding 
of the world. Hegel also placed beauty in art as higher in priority than 
natural beauty (Prickett 108). Martin Heidegger, the twentieth century 
German philosopher, attributed to poetry an even higher status: “Poetry is 
the foundation which supports history, and is therefore not mere appearance 
of culture . . . it is poetry which first makes language possible. Poetry is the 
primitive language of a historical people” (111).
 As Prickett documents this progression of thought, it becomes clear 
that George MacDonald was in a unique position to appropriate these ideas. 
Most Englishmen were isolated from German writing. Prickett relates that in 
1821 there were “only two men in the whole University of Oxford who knew 
any German at all. Cambridge was only marginally better off’ (118). Julius 
Hare of Trinity College, however, was one of the finest German scholars in 
England. F. D. Maurice, the great mentor of MacDonald, was a disciple of 
Hare and Coleridge, and even married Hare’s daughter. From these people 
and from the influence of the Cambridge Platonists, MacDonald increased his 
familiarity with the German Romantic tradition.
 A second advantage MacDonald had was his Scottish education. 
Scotland was much more open than England to new German ideas. The 
best place to encounter them in Britain was Edinburgh, where Coleridge 
and Carlyle were educated (117). MacDonald’s biographers confirm that 
he learnt German and began reading the German Romantics before leaving 
Scotland for England (although the claim, repeated by most biographers, that 
he encountered them while working at a castle in the far north is no longer 
accepted). [91]
 Hare is the person whom Prickett credits with bringing together 
the German and English Romantic traditions, especially with Guesses 
at Truth (1827), “a collection of literary, philosophic and religious 
fragments” (118-19). In contrast to the Schlegels, Hare’s philosophy of 
literature is “a historical rather than an idealist aesthetic” (120). Drawing 
from Goethe’s biological theories, Hare saw that “the best metaphor for 
human consciousness was that of an organism” (120). Hare and Coleridge 
recognised from their study of German Romantics that the incompleteness 
of the fragments was itself an indication of how we perceive truth. Prickett 
quotes from Guesses at Truth:
          Is not every Grecian temple complete even though it be in 
          ruins? just as the very fragments of their poems are like the 
          scattered leaves of some unfading flower. Is not every Gothic 
          minster unfinished? And for the best of reasons, because it is 
          infinite . . . . (Prickett 121)
Compare this with a similar thought of the schoolmaster Mr Graham’s in
MacDonald’s novel Malcolm:
          If I knew of a theory in which was never an uncompleted arch 
          or turret, in whose circling wall was never a ragged breach, 
          that theory I should know but to avoid. Such gaps are the 
          eternal windows through which the dawn shall look in. A 
          complete theory is a vault of stone around the theorist—whose 
          very being depends upon room to grow.
 Another intriguing part of the book is Prickett’s examination of two 
important thinkers on the understanding of fragmentary knowledge and the 
proper role of irony in its interpretation. The first of these is John Henry 
Newman. Newman’s innovative approach to how truth develops is not what 
many people would assume. A truth is not more likely to be true because it 
is simpler—it is precisely because something is more complex that it is more 
likely to be true. This, according to Newman, is an indication of the truth of 
the Catholic Church. Truth is not reductionistic, but it organically assimilates 
new understanding without rejecting the old. As Newman suggests in The 
Grammar of Ascent, the apprehension of that truth comes from making a 
personal assent of faith. Prickett notes that the scientific theorist Michael 
Polanyi advances the same theory in Personal Knowledge (1958). Polanyi 
asserts that “fiduciary assent” is necessary in all realms of knowledge, 
including scientific.
 The second of these landmark thinkers is the Danish philosopher 
Soren Kierkegaard, who wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1841 on The 
Concept of Irony. Kierkegaard distinguishes three levels or stages of faith 
which he calls the “dialectical triad.” It is worthwhile to look at an example 
of this “triad” to see how the mind should work in understanding ironic 
literature. The most familiar [92] example, from Fear and Trembling, 
examines Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac. Prickett explains that the point about 
the stages of the triad:
          is that each is good in itself; but is fatally (and ironically) 
          undermined by the next. Thus, what he calls “the beautiful 
          story” of Abraham and his son Isaac on Mount Moriah must 
          stand criticism from the ethical standpoint (is it ever right to 
          practice human sacrifice? . . .) But, in turn, the ethical is 
          undermined by the religious, in which God’s will (however 
          mysterious) is seen to prevail. Each level is wholly 
          incommensurable with the others, yet as each higher stage 
          is reached, the earlier stages, which originally looked like 
          ultimate values in themselves, are re-interpreted and revalued 
          But, for Kierkegaard, the aesthetic cannot ever be subsumed 
          into the ethical, nor the ethical into the religious. Their values 
          are not overturned or denied, they are, in Bloom’s word, 
          incommensurable. Plurality and irony are not so much the result 
          of imperfect understanding, or incomplete knowledge, they are 
          . . . part of the very fabric of existence. (258-59)
 A few paragraphs later, Prickett suggests that, for the times we are 
living in, the order of Kierkegaard’s triad of faith should be reversed to:
                              aesthetic
                        ethical     
                                                religious 
          We thus start with (what is now) the externally controlled and 
          bounded, and move through the inner-directed limitations of 
          the ethical, before arriving . . . at the terrifying non-choice 
          of the truly free, to respond to the transcendent Other. If we find 
          this better expressed in our time by the arts than in what is 
          now popularly meant by “religion,” we would not be alone. 
          Hans Urs von Balthasar’s attempt to approach God by way of 
          Kant’s third critique, on Beauty, was startlingly at odds with 
          the conventional Thomism of Catholic thought when it first 
          appeared in mid century, but it was to prove prophetic. (259-60)
 Prickett makes the following summary, with a glancing reference to 
MacDonald (the only one in the book, although there are significant tributes 
to C. S. Lewis and Owen Barfield elsewhere):
          What is valuable about Kierkegaard’s trinity is that it makes 
          pluralism not an accidental or contingent phenomenon of 
          modern society, but a normal and indeed essential ingredient 
          of experience. If the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious can 
          be described as occupying the same inner space, they tell 
          utterly different narratives about it. All three narratives are, 
          however, properly ironic in that they share an awareness 
          not necessarily of what is concealed, but that there is a 
          concealed; that there is more that can be said; that there are 
          many different and conflicting descriptions of what it is like at 
          the Back of the North Wind. (260-61) [93]
 In any book attempting to identify trends over a span of three 
hundred years, something is bound to receive less attention. For me, that 
something is the sparse recognition of writers sympathetic with Prickett’s 
conclusion about the value of aesthetic judgement in apprehending “the 
transcendent Other.” The most striking omission is that of John Ruskin, the 
most influential art critic of the nineteenth century. This premier Victorian 
thinker and friend of MacDonald is not mentioned even once.
 In the twentieth century, although Hans Urs von Balthasar is given 
the brief accolade quoted above, Prickett does not identify him as a scholar 
within the very fruitful tradition of Phenomenology. Heidegger, whom 
Prickett acknowledges as the most significant twentieth-century philosopher, 
was the student of Husserl, the “father” of Phenomenology. Other religious 
philosophers with a phenomenal approach include Gabriel Marcel, Martin 
Burber, and Deitrich von Hildebrand. John Paul II, a prolific and important 
theologian, was influenced by von Balthasar (and shares with F. D. Maurice 
the distinction of having been a professor of moral philosophy). It would be 
interesting for Prickett to carry his investigation one step further, to evaluate 
twentieth-century phenomenological philosophers and theologians. Perhaps 
thay have their fingers on the pulse of current paradigm changes. Perhaps 
Phenomenology will be for the twenty-first century what Romanticism was 
for the nineteenth.
 Prickett’s contribution to literary interpretation and theory has 
advanced another step, with an undertaking more ambitious than anything 
he has undertaken previously. His content is intellectually challenging, yet 
clear; compelling, and occasionally humorous. Students of MacDonald 
owe him an especial debt of gratitude for the way he continues to provide 
strong, scholarly evidence of MacDonald’s literary and aesthetic genius and 
the importance of approaching his writings in a non-reductionist manner. 
MacDonald frequently uses layered meaning and irony, allowing his reader 
to encounter truth in a fresh way. This technique evokes a meaning in his 
writing that is not reducible to a system of propositions. It is also a way to 
introduce his readers to “the transcendent Other.”
 The following extract from MacDonald’s 1888 preface to the English 
translation of Ein Kamph ums Recht (For the Right) by Karl Emil Franzos, 
may serve as a validation and benediction of Prickett’s achievement.
          The more evident tendency of art for some time has been to 
          an infinite degeneracy. The cry of “art for art’s sake,” as a 
          protest against the pursuit of art for the sake of money or 
          fame, one can recognise in its half wisdom, knowing the right 
          cry to be “Art for truth’s sake!” But when certain writers tell 
          us that the true aim of the author of fiction is to give the people 
          what they want, namely, a reflection, as in a mirror, of 
          themselves—a mirror not such as will show them to [94] 
          themselves as they are, but as they seem to each other—some 
          of us feel that we stand on the verge of an abyss of falsehood 
          The people—in whose favour they seem to live and move and 
          have their being—desire, they say, no admixture of further 
          object, nothing to indicate they ought to be not what they are, 
          or show them what they ought to be: they acknowledge no 
          relation with the ideal, only that which is themselves . . . and 
          what they think and do. Such writers do not understand that 
          nothing does or can exist except the ideal, nor is their art-
          philosophy other than “procuress to the lords of hell.” Whoever 
          has an ideal and is making no struggle towards it, is sinking 
          into the outer darkness. The ideal is the end, and must be 
          the object of life. Attained, or but truly conceived, we must 
          think of it as indispensable. [95]
